

Calcutta University Readership Lectures

ON SOME ASPECTS OF THE  
DOCTRINES OF MAITREYA [NĀTHA]  
AND ASĀNGA

[BEING A COURSE OF FIVE LECTURES DELIVERED  
AT THE UNIVERSITY OF CALCUTTA]

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
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# I

## MAITREYA[NATHA] AND HIS WORKS

My first duty is to thank the University authorities for having invited me to deliver some lectures upon Buddhist subjects. It is a very great honour for me to have as chairman the leading authority on Indian Philosophy, Prof. S. N. Dasgupta and to speak in an Atheneum which has glorious traditions and which following the impulse and the wish of Sir Asutosh Mookerjee has contributed to Buddhist scholarship as no other Indian University has done as yet. It is here in fact that the student is afforded those opportunities which he would scarcely find elsewhere, I mean those branches subsidiary to Indology, such as Tibetan and Chinese which are absolutely necessary, when we want to carry on Buddhist research on a wider scheme. Because there is no doubt that, in spite of the interest that Buddhist studies have raised, still Buddhism and its problems are but very little known to us. It is for this reason that in these lectures I have limited myself only to some particular aspects of Mahāyāna, which for the multiplicity of its

schools, the activity and the originality of its doctors, its wonderful conquest of all Asia, its strict connection with Hinduism, its undeniable contribution to Hindu logical, theological and even Tantric systems, represents one of the most attractive fields of Indology, which can shed unexpected light upon many still unsolved problems.

I hardly need to say that my lectures will be technical. But it is always necessary to have recourse to the sources, to discuss and to analyze them, if we wish to avoid any generalisation and to make progress in researches. Moreover many of the things which I shall say are chiefly based upon new manuscript material brought back by me from Nepal or upon the Chinese and Tibetan translations of works, which seem to have disappeared in India.

It is generally said that Mahāyāna may be divided into two fundamental schools, *viz.*, Mādhyamika and Yogācāra. This statement must not be taken literally. First of all it is not exact to affirm that these two tendencies were always opposed to each other. Moreover not only each one of these main currents is split into a series of different sub-sects, but the Vijñānavāda, at least for some time and in some parts of India, may be claimed to have represented a quite independent tendency of thought with its own fundamental sūtras. Without anticipating my ideas about the original difference between the

Vijñāna-vāda and the Yogācāra school which will be the argument of another study, I must now insist on the first point, *viz.*, that the antagonism between the Mādhyamika and the first expounders of the idealistic school such as Maitreya, Asaṅga and even Vasubandhu is not so marked as it appears at first sight. This is proved not only by the internal evidence of the most ancient systematical texts, but also by many facts which deserve our notice. Maitreya, the master, as we shall see, of Asaṅga and the recognized founder of the Yogācāra school, comments upon a work of Nāgārjuna, the Bhavaśaṅkrānti.

So also one Vasubodhisattva, generally identified with Vasubandhu, comments upon the Sataśāstra, one of the most prominent works by Āryadeva, the disciple of Nāgārjuna. Moreover, curiously enough, the Catuhśataka by this same author, the extant fragment of which with a commentary by Candrakīrti was discovered and edited by our venerable *guru* Haraprasāda Sāstrī and is being re-edited and completely restored from the Tibetan translation by that other great scholar of yours, Vidhuśekhara Sāstrī, is called in the colophon Bodhisattva-yogācāra-śāstra. Nāgārjuna is quoted by Asaṅga, Vasubandhu, Sthiramati. So also is Rāhula, who was his pupil, not his *guru*, as it is sometimes said on the authority of the Tibetan sources, which, in this case, seem to have mixed up the

Siddha-Rāhulabhadra with the old ācārya of the same name. The fact is that both Nāgārjuna as well as Maitreya, along with their immediate disciples acknowledged the same fundamental tenets, and their work was determined by the same ideals, though holding quite different views in many a detail. Both were followers of the Mahāyāna, which implies that they equally admitted that internal as well as external phenomena are devoid of reality; these phenomena are not existent *in se* and *per se* inasmuch as they are conditioned and relative; *pudgala* as well as *dharma*s are merely *nairātmya* and therefore *śūnya*, void. As to the *caryā*, conduct, both laid special stress upon mental *yoga* (*yogacaryā*), and maintained that the arhatship, the ideal of the Hīnayāna, was not the only and final aim of Buddhism.

They substitute for it the *bodhicitta*, as the ideal of the bodhisattva, and this *bodhicitta* is *śūnya-* and *karuṇā-garba*, *i. e.*, it results of two chief constituents, *viz.*, the notion of voidness of all phenomena and the compassion for all beings. The one concerns the *prajñā*, that is the intellectual side of the career of the Bodhisattva and contains the elaborate process of meditation by which, through successive mental *ālambanas* and their progressive annulment by the higher ones, mind is purified; the other comprehends moral activity. All these things had been laid down in a numberless series of Mahāyāna-sūtras, the date

and the origin of which is still unknown, but which, in the main, are far anterior to Nāgārjuna himself who systematises the teachings therein contained. It is an enormous literature which shows how characteristic Hindu ideas were creeping into Buddhism. Written in various times and even in various parts of India, these texts, composed by some unknown authors who gave authority to their compilations attributing them to Buddha himself, bear also traces of foreign elements. They represent the reaction of Buddhism in contact with a larger mass of adherents and followers. They represent in a word the Buddhism of the laymen much more than the Buddhism of a strict community of monks. The notion of Buddha himself was deeply changed ; Sākyamuni is no longer a master but the hypostasis of the absolute, the *dharmadhātu*, the *tathā-gatagarbha*. But all this literature was extremely unsystematical. It contained mere attempts at speculative ideas, but no definite formulation of them. The language was unable, as it were, to express the deep thoughts which those unknown mystics arrived at, by the mere force of their meditation. It was with them the contrary of what happened with the Hīnayāna schools which had given a definite shape to the teachings contained in the sūtras, elaborating the most complex works of Abhidharma, such as the Jñāna-prasthāna along with its pādas and its enormous

commentary, the *Vibhāṣā*, which may be ranked among the greatest attempts at dogmatical systematisation that India ever knew. The followers of the Mahāyāna were therefore confronted with an urgent necessity, *viz.*, that of proving that their sūtras were *Buddha-bhāṣita*. It was also necessary to solve the many apparent or real contradictions among the various texts and to put some order in the doctrines, therein expounded. This work was attempted by two masters who can equally be considered as the founders of Mahāyāna-dogmatics, I mean Nāgārjuna and Maitreya. The first wrote with this purpose the *Mūlamādhyamikakārikās* in which the sūnyatā doctrine is logically demonstrated and the big commentary upon the *Sata-sāhasrikāprajñāpāramitā* which, as stated by the author himself in many places, was conceived with the view of opposing a Mahāyāna *abhidharma* to the *abhidharma* of Kātyāyanīputra. Maitreya is less known though there can hardly be any doubt that he occupies in the history of Indian philosophy no inferior place to Nāgārjuna himself. Still he was not for a long time considered to be an historical person. This is partly due to some Chinese sources such as the "life of *Vasubandhu*" by Paramārtha and the biography of Yuen Chuang which attribute his works to Asaṅga, though adding that they were revealed to him in the Tuṣita heaven by Bodhisattva Maitreya. But this tradition is contradicted by the

Tibetan accounts according to which Maitreya is the author of five Sāstras, by the internal evidence furnished by many works composed by him, and by numerous quotations from them to be found in the treatises of Asaṅga. The historicity therefore of Maitreya can hardly be doubted now, after the careful investigation of the subject by Prof. Ui, who has devoted to the study of this problem two interesting papers. His views had been supported by me on the authority of two other sources : the *Abhisamayālaṅkārāloka* and the commentary by Sthiramati upon the tīkā of Vasubandhu on the *Madhyāntavibhaṅga* of Maitreya. The fact is evident that the personality of Maitreya has somehow been eclipsed by the great activity of his pupil Asaṅga, who devoted himself to commenting and elucidating the teachings of his *guru* and also by his being identified with the famous Bodhisattva Maitreya with whom a very large literature is connected, carefully investigated by the Japanese scholars. But the fact that the master of Asaṅga is called Bodhisattva, thus facilitating his identification with the mythological Maitreya, has in itself no value for denying his historical character, because it is known that all the great doctors of Mahāyāna such as Asaṅga himself, Nāgārjuna, Diśnāga, Vasubandhu are designated with this appellative. Moreover it cannot be overlooked that in the colophon of the *Abhisamayālaṅkāra* preserved in its Sanskrit original

and one of the five Sāstras attributed to Maitreya by the Tibetan tradition, the name of the author is given as Maitreyanātha. This form, the antiquity of which is proved by the fact that it occurs also in the Tibetan translation of the same work and which is to be found also in the colophon of the commentary upon the Bhavaśaṅkrānti shows that though born in a family of worshippers or believers of the Bodhisattva Maitreya, the Yogācāra master must have been quite different from the Maitreya of the Mahāyāna scriptures. In order to avoid any confusion it is better to call him Maitreyanātha, which name has many chances to be the real one. He was the recognized *guru* of the *saṃpradāya* of the Abhisamaya, as clearly said by Haribhadra in the introductory verses to the Āloka, where Maitreya, Asaṅga, Vasubandhu, Bhadanta Vimuktisena and Ārya Vimuktisena are mentioned.

The question whether we must consider Maitreyanātha as a historical person or not has not a mere philological importance, because it is strictly connected with that of the first attempt at the *systematisation* of Buddhist idealism. Our sources, as we saw, point out that this idealistic tendency, already anticipated in many Mahāyāna-sūtras, was given a more elaborate shape by Maitreyanātha and since he was, beyond any doubt, the master of Asaṅga, the elder brother of Vasubandhu, and on the other hand the commentator of

Nāgārjuna, we must place the origin of the idealistic current, as a system with its own Sāstras, at about the end of III century or the beginning of IV century A.D.

But what are the works attributed to him? The reply is easy as regards the name of the treatises, but becomes more difficult as regards the extent of the same works. I mean to say that this difficulty arises from the fact that many of these works have been handed down to us with commentaries which can hardly be separated from the kārikā-portion. This fact has been the cause why the author of the commentary has supplanted the author of the kārikās, so that all the treatises in prose and verse have been attributed to a single person, *viz.*, the commentator. I think that from the material at our disposal we may draw the conclusion that with almost no exception Maitreyanātha was the author of the kārikā portion of the works connected with him by the Tibetan or Chinese tradition. These kārikās were then commented upon by Asaṅga according to the teaching that was imparted to him by the author himself who had been his *guru*. That is why there is such an uncertainty in our sources as regards the authorship of the works of Maitreyanātha, while, on the other hand, from the strict dependence of Asaṅga on his master we may infer that Asaṅga's work, apart from some minor detail, faithfully represents the early stage of Indian

idealism, further and substantial progress and therefore new theories having been inserted in the school only by the great brother and disciple of Asaṅga, *viz.*, Vasubandhu. The kārikās of Maitreya were of such a kind as to deserve really a commentary. Without its help they can hardly be understood as they have the same conciseness as the *sūtras*. But, as a matter of fact, his works were really metrical commentaries upon the Mahāyāna-sūtras, *viz.*, they were chiefly *alaṅkāras*. This is a kind of literary composition peculiar to the ancient Buddhist schools and the existence of which was already known to us through a reference to be found in Subandhu's Vāsavadattā, where the author compares Vāsavadattā to *bauddhasaṅgitim alaṅkārabhūṣitām*. Here, according to the commentator Narasimha, *alaṅkāra* has the meaning of “Buddhaśāstra.” Now the publication of the Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra by Sylvain Lévi and that of the Abhisamayālaṅkāra by Stcherbatsky and the Abhisamayālaṅkārāloka by me has put us in a condition to exactly understand what an *alaṅkāra* was. It is an exegetical work which may be called a commentary, in so far as it explains either a particular book, as in the case of the Abhisamayālaṅkāra, or a class of books, as the Sūtrālaṅkāra, but it is not a commentary in the usual sense of the word, because it does not explain any particular passage separately taken, but all the *sūtra* or the *sūtras* as

a whole. Moreover the *alāṅkāras* are all in verses and they enumerate and classify the various topics contained in the sūtras. It is evident that the chief aim of the authors of these *alāṅkāras* was to bring some systematical arrangement in the clumsy and bulky Mahāyāna treatises and, while formulating a new system, to support their claim that the new ideas were all concealed in these venerable texts. This is not the place to discuss how far they succeeded and how much the sūtras can be believed to contain all the complex doctrines that Maitreyanātha attributes to them. But the fact remains that these *alāṅkāras* can rightly be considered as the link between the Mahāyāna-sūtras and the new philosophy of the Yogācāra. Another conclusion seems to derive itself from the study of these *alāṅkāras*, viz., that they needed a commentary. Perhaps they are to be considered only as *versus memoriales*, the exact counterpart of the orthodox philosophical sūtras, in which the topics were concisely arranged that the masters developed in their teachings to the pupils. In fact the kārikās of the Sūtrālāṅkāra as well as those of the Abhisamayālāṅkāra, would hardly be intelligible without a commentary. This implies that before the compilation of these commentaries they were explained *viva voce* by the *guru*. This fact which was noted by Lüders as regards some fragments from Central Asia belonging to the same type of literature is quite confirmed by the tradition which

asserts in our case that Maitreya was the author of the *kārikās*, while Asaṅga received from him the instruction about them and then, accordingly composed or rather compiled his commentaries upon them. Sometimes he seems also to have only preserved orally the explanations of his *guru* and to have, then, transmitted them to Vasubandhu who subsequently wrote them down as expounded to him by Asaṅga. Such was perhaps the case of the *Vajracchedikāpāramitāśāstra*. In fact, according to I Tsing, Asaṅga received from Maitreya the *kārikās* of eighty verses only and then Vasubandhu commented upon them. The same happened with the *Madhyāntavibhāga* because from the commentary upon it by Sthiramati it does not appear that Asaṅga did effectively write a commentary upon it, but only that he explained the *kārikās* of Maitreya to his younger brother.

If what I have said is right, it seems that we have to see in the *alaṅkāras* and cognate works the Buddhist correspondent of the Brahminical *sūtras* which were being written almost at that same time. The Buddhists do not seem in fact to have known the *sūtras*-style; the only examples of books written in *sūtras* are the *Satasāstra* of Āryadeva, the pupil of Nāgārjuna, and the *Nyāyabindu* of Dharmakīrti. Instead of the *sūtras* we have *alaṅkāras* or allied metrical summaries which may be considered as the model of the *kārikās* of Vasubandhu or of those of Diṅnāga and Dharm-

kirti, which are equally hardly intelligible without a running commentary.

But what are the works of Maitreya[nātha] which we may now consult if we want to know the main features of his system and to put him in his proper place in the general development of Buddhist philosophy?

(a) *Abhisamayālaṅkāra*, or according to its full title *pañcarimśati-prajñāpāramitopadeśa-abhisamayālaṅkāra-sāstram*. The work, unknown to the Chinese translators, but preserved in a Tibetan version is still extant in Sanskrit. The text has been recently edited by Th. Stcherbatsky; but, as it is almost incomprehensible, a commentary is needed. Fortunately this commentary exists. It is the *Abhisamayālaṅkārāloka* by Haribhadra, one of the books most studied in the monasteries of Tibet, where Buddhist learning is still alive. This huge work which embodies also the kārikās of Maitreya is being edited by me in its Sanskrit original and will be out within two or three months. Haribhadra's work sheds a great light upon the most abstruse points of Yogācāra philosophy and upon the yoga and meditative process of the Buddhist schools. It is at the same time a commentary upon the *Aṣṭasāhasrikāprajñāpāramitā* and it includes very important abstracts from his predecessors, chiefly from Bhadanta Vimuktisena and Ārya Vimuktisena. Considering the antiquity and the importance of the *Abhisamayālaṅkāra* and its difficulty

I thought that the discovery of the works of the predecessors of Haribhadra could have helped us very much in understanding the position of Maitreyanātha and therefore, during my stay in Nepal, I tried my very best to recover them. It was impossible to find any trace of Bhadanta Vimuktisena's work but I was lucky enough to bring back the *Abhisamayālaṅkāravyākhyā* of Ārya Vimuktisena. In this way one of the most important works of Buddhist mysticism stands now before us with two of the most authoritative commentaries which will help us to understand the text, the knowledge of which is necessary even for entering the complex theories of Buddhist Tantras.

(b) *Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra*, edited by Sylvain Lévi. The kārikās only belong to Maitreya and the commentary to Asaṅga, or, if we are to follow other sources, to Vasubandhu. Since this text is known to Sanskritists I do not need to insist upon it.

(c) *Madhyāntavibhāga*, or *Madhyānta-vibhāga*. It is one of the most important, if not the most important, works of Maitreya, because it explains and discusses problems of more philosophical interest than the other treatises. The Chinese Canon has preserved a translation of the kārikās and one of the commentaries by Vasubandhu. The Tibetan *bsTan-agyur* contains the kārikās, the commentary by Vasubandhu and the *ṭīkā* on this by

Sthiramati. Even in this case, Nepal has delivered us again one of his treasures. In fact I brought back a copy of this unique work; it is unfortunately fragmentary but by the combined efforts of myself and of Vidhuśekhara Śāstrī it is hoped to be restored completely in its Sanskrit original form. The first chapter is to come out shortly and it is expected that this treatise will shed a great light upon the Yogācāra school before the definite elaboration of Vasubandhu. Sthiramati always follows the *pūrvācāryas* and was therefore blamed by K'uei-chi for his reproducing old theories.

Among the works lost in Sanskrit we must quote here :

(d) Dharmadharmatāvibhaṅga, preserved only in Tibetan with a commentary by Vasubandhu.

(e) Mahāyāna-uttaratantra which the Tibetan tradition ascribes to Maitreya, while the Chinese tradition ascribes it to Sāramati or Sthiramati.

According to Professor Ui, who has strongly supported the view that Maitreya is an historical person, even the Yogacaryābhūmiśāstra is by Maitreya. This statement seems to be contradicted, it is true, by the colophon to be found in the Tibetan translation which attributes the work to Asaṅga. But we may oppose to the Tibetan sources the fact that Yuan Chwang in the Si yu ki attributes this enormous treatise in one hundred volumes to Maitreya[nātha]. His statement is

supported by Asaṅga himself who in his Āryapravacanabhāṣya refers to that book of his *guru* as the source from which he took the inspiration and the materials for his new sāstra. Perhaps the solution of the problem is to be found in a conciliation between the two opposite views. I mean to say that it is quite possible that in this case also we are confronted with a kārikā portion written or dictated by Maitreya and a commentary written by his foremost pupil. Whatever the case may be there is no doubt that this book is to the Yogācāra philosophy that which the Jñānaprasthāna is to the Ābhidharmikas or the Mahāprajñāpāramitāśāstra to the Mādhyamikas. It states the way of the Bodhisattva along the seventeen bhūmis or stages; hence its other name Saptadaśa-bhūmiśāstra under which it is also known. But its real name was Yoga-caryā-bhūmiśāstra and certainly not Yogācāryabhūmiśāstra as the Chinese rendering suggests, based as it is on a wrong etymology and division of the samāsa. The Tibetan rendering “*spyod*” leaves but little doubt that we have to read caryā and not ācārya. If we want to be acquainted with the fundamental tenets of the Yogācāra, we must evidently start from the study of this text and now the Sanskrit material at our disposal, I mean the Abhisamayālaṅkāra, the Sūtrālaṅkāra, the Madhyāntavibhaṅga, and the Bodhisattva-bhūmiśāstra, which is related to the school, have

fortunately put us in a condition to undertake a successful investigation of this book.

The result of all these investigations is therefore that Maitreya[nātha] is quite different from the mythical Bodhisattva Maitreya in whose legend the messianic ideas of the Iranian people most probably have crept and who plays such a part in the apocalyptic and prophetic literature of Mahāyāna. Maitreya[nātha] was an historical master who must be credited with the first systematisation of the Yogācāra philosophy. The study of Indian Idealism must therefore begin with his works. And then it will be realized how great is the place that he occupies in the general evolution of Indian philosophy. It is not therefore strange if the question of Maitreya has now become one of the foremost problems upon which Buddhologists are engaged.

But what are, then, the fundamental ideas and the main principles of the doctrine of Maitreya[nātha]? We shall study this point in our next lecture.

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## II

### THE FUNDAMENTAL THEORIES OF MAITREYA[NĀTHA]

What are the main features of the system of Maitr̄ya or Maitreyanātha? When we examine his works we cannot fail to notice a general and fundamental characteristic common to all. I mean the attempt for the conciliation of the various tendencies existent in Buddhism. It is a fact that whatever might have been the relations between Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna, as regards the religious and the practical side of the question, an undeniable antagonism is to be found in the doctrines preached by the most characteristic texts of the two currents. Leaving aside the Pratyekabuddha-yāna, which had a purely theoretical and dogmatical value, the fact is evident that between the monastic ideal represented by the arhatship and that of the bodhisattva there was a gulf. And there was also a gulf in many other points concerned with the dogmatical aspect of the religion and with those speculative elements in it, which, in a country like India, always interested in the philosophical side of the things, were to

play such an important part in the general history of Indian mind. Mahāyāna-sūtras were equally considered as having been revealed by Buddha himself, but the difference and even the contradiction between the two quite divergent outlooks of life, ideals, practices and doctrines was soon felt. Bitter quarrels were going on among the followers of the various schools; of these quarrels we find traces in the figure of Mahādeva, in the prophecies about the decline of the law contained in the Mahāyānist Mahāparinirvāṇasūtras and perhaps in the legend itself connected with the death of Nāgārjuna, which seems to hide with miraculous embellishments the tradition that he committed suicide. We learn in fact from the Chinese and Tibetan sources that he was accused by the Śrāvakas, that is the followers of Hīnayāna, to have forged the Mahāprajñāpāramitā, which he was said to have received from the Nāgas. This legend deserves a closer investigation as it is quite possible that Nāgārjuna was something more than a simple commentator of the prajñā. But anyhow he is equally hostile to the Hīnayānists and their greatest interpreters as he was to the Tīrthikas. Some texts tried to solve the apparent contradiction between Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna teachings by having recourse to the able theory of the double truth, the *saṃvṛti-satya* and the *paramārtha-satya* which was soon grafted on the other doctrine, characteristically Mahāyāna,

of the upāyakauśalatā of the Buddha and the fundamental variety of the beings, which implies that if the doctrine is really to be effective it must be preached quite in accordance with the moral and intellectual abilities of the various creatures to whom it is expounded. Later on a new doctrine was also elaborated according to which the different sūtras were spoken by Buddha in three or even in five different times. It is evident that in all these cases we are confronted with attempts at giving full currency, within the large compass of Buddhism, as a whole, to the most discordant views. It is also quite clear that such conciliatory steps were chiefly taken by the adherents of the Mahāyāna at a very early time, since the Ekayāna theory, as opposed to the Three-yānas theory, had already been enunciated in some of the oldest Mahāyāna sūtras such as the Saddharma-puṇḍarīka.

But, if it was relatively easy to assert this theory of the Ekayāna, it was certainly difficult to combine in a logical way all practical, dogmatical, mystical and theological tenets representing the main characteristic of the two schools. This was attempted by Maitreya-[nātha] in the Sūtrālaṅkāra and chiefly in the Abhisamayālaṅkāra, where the Hīnayānas as well as the Mahāyāna-caryā are combined in the *abhisamaya*, that is the mystical ascension towards the supreme realisation. There is a

continuous process and progress, *anupūrvī*, so that the supreme moment is to be reached gradually, *kramena*. Unfortunately we are not yet in a condition to state how far Maitreya was original in building up his system, which contains things that are not to be found in the extant mystical Buddhist literature anterior to him. But the fact is undeniable that he has succeeded in elaborating one of the most imposing monuments of Indian mysticism. He had before him the *prajñāpāramitā*-literature, which, it appears to us, is overloaded with repetitions and contains nothing more than the principle of voidness of everything, *sarvaśūnyatā*. This doctrine is formulated in all possible ways and with such a length of detail and particulars as there can hardly be, it seems, a work less interesting reading than this. Now all the contents of the *Prajñāpāramitā* in 25,000 *ślokas*, *viz.*, the *Pañcavimśatisāhasrikā-prajñāpāramitā* have been catalogued and classified in such a way—as to include all the successive moments of the *caryā* of the Buddhist in a logical series. We are no longer in a condition to determine how far this implied meaning of the *Prajñā*-literature was due to Maitreya-nātha or if he has codified in his *alaṅkāra* anterior traditions of exegesis of the same text. The thing is not improbable, because I hardly know of any book written in India, which does not possess a much deeper and more pregnant meaning

than what appears at first sight. Nor can we forget that these texts, which perhaps were not much older than Nāgārjuna himself, could scarcely have been written in such a language if they had not to convey a more coherent meaning than the literal one. This at least has always been the general case in India. But I do not dare to advance any solution of the problem until further material is available. It is quite evident anyhow that after the publication of this work with his commentaries and after the study of the Mahā-prajñāpāramitāśāstra by Nāgārjuna, the investigation of the prajñā-literature must be taken up again and then it will be found that these texts contain or at least they were generally supposed to contain a deeper, wider and more interesting meaning than what we have up to now attributed to them. The Pañcavimśatisāhasrikā-prajñā-pāramitā and the Aṣṭasāhasrikā-prajñāpāramitā are now divided into eight items which classify the process of meditation of those who have entered the *mārga* from the preparatory and introductory moments of the ādhikarmika up to the dharmakāya. The fundamental moments of this process are represented by the *trisarvajñatā*, *viz.*, the three-fold omniscience, the *sarvajñatā*, simple omniscience of the śrāvakas and *pratyekabuddhas*; the *mārgajñatā* belonging to the bodhisattvas, and the *sarvākārajñatā*, the complete wisdom of the Buddha, which represents the final goal of the

way. While all the topics of the *prajñā* are said to be seventy, the moments of the *sarvajñatā* are one hundred and seventy-three.

But this world which displays itself before our mind in the process of meditation is not real. According to this system, the *prajñāpāramitānaya* is *sarvadharma-nairūtmya-dyotaka*, as Haribhadra comments, echoing the *ipsissima verba* of the *śāstra*; the three *dhātus* of existence are in fact non-existent, but *adhyāropita*, the result of an unreal assumption. When we speak of an object we must remember that every *viśayasthiti* is nothing else but a mere moment of our consciousness, *saṃvedana*. The process of meditation leading to *mokṣa* is based upon two moments, one positive and another negative, the *pakṣa* and the *pratipakṣa* corresponding to *āya-vyaya*, viz., *vidhi* and *nिषेध*, the two possible ways through which our mind realizes itself in its function. But these two moments have only a conventional and relative existence, not a real one. The process and progress of meditation towards the *sarvākārajñatā* is realised through a successive series of *kṣṇas*, instants, which are nothing else but the provisory support of the immediately following one. This support-instant, *ālambana*, is but the idea that at a particular moment develops in our mind from mind itself, without any relation whatever with an independent object; this is the *ākāra*; *ālambana-prakāra evākāraḥ*; *saṃvinniṣṭhā ca viśayasthitih*.

Everything is true in the very moment in which it is thought, but it will not be so in the next instant ; when we are really progressing, a new *ākāra* will take the place of the former and it will be a mistake if there happens to be any attachment to it, *abhinivesa*. *E.g.*, for the *śrāvaka* there is something real called *rūpa* which has the characteristic of *rūpanā*, being subject to decay, and therefore the *ākāra* under which it appears is that of the *anitya*, impermanence. But for the bodhisattva the *ālambana* will be just the *anitya* and the *ākāra* of it will be the *anabhinivesa*, unattachment; but even this has the mere value of a *pratipakṣa*, negation of the previous instant, because whatever is affirmed or denied is a *vikalpa* or an *abhisamṣkāra*, necessary of course for the purpose of meditation, *abhisamṣkāram-antareṇa bhāvanānupapatteḥ* (p. 53), but devoid in fact of any reality. Because we cannot say that *rūpa* either is or is not, in as much as it is *śūnya* and the *śūnya* is devoid of any qualification, is *animitta*. In fact the absolute that Maitreya-nātha calls *tattva* as well as *dharmatā* is something in which there is nothing that can be specified or which can specify; no subject as well as no object is in it; it is *lakṣyalakṣaṇavivinirmukta*. A dharma whatsoever cannot be defined either *in se* or having regard to other things, either in its peculiar aspects or in its genus ; it is *svasāmānyalakṣaṇarāhita*, because every *lakṣaṇa* is only *prajñapti*, ideation

and ideation is nothing but *vikalpa*, while the reality, the *dharmaṭā*, is *avācyatā*, beyond words.

ālambanam anityādi satyādhāram ṭadākṛtiḥ ।  
 niṣedho 'bhiniveśāder hetur yānatrayāptaye ॥28  
 rūpādyāyavyayau viṣṭhāsthitī prajñāptyavā-  
 cyatā ।  
 rūpādāvasthitis teṣāṁ tadbhāvenāsvabhāvatā ॥29  
 taylor mithah svabhāvatvam tadanityādyasam-  
 sthitih ।  
 tāsāṁ tadbhāvaśūnyatvam mithah svābhāvyam  
 etayoh ॥30  
 anudraho yo dharmāṇām tan nimittāsamīk-  
 ṣāṇam ।  
 parīkṣāṇam ca prajñāyāḥ sarvasyānupalam-  
 bhataḥ ॥31

So, in this book, the idealistic tenets which will be developed in a more systematical way by the followers of Maitreya, have been inserted into the frame of the mystic ascension of the saint; but speculation has only a secondary place here and the real object of the *Alaṅkāra* is to propose a manual of *yoga*, combining the manifold tendencies, moments or aspects of Buddhist mysticism; all the various elements of the different *caryās* are united and harmonised here. We have the theory of the *bhūmis* and that of the *dhyāna*, that of the *saṃāpatti* and that

of the *śamatha* and *vipaśyanā*. But each one has been given its proper place, so that a logical and coherent continuity develops out of these occasionally heterogeneous materials and the path is shown that leads the *pratipannaka* to the highest perfection through successive stages. As it is, therefore, the *Abhisamayālankāra* may be considered as the Buddhist counterpart of the Brahminical *Yogasūtras* and there is no doubt, according to me, that this text brings new materials for the study of the relation between the classical yoga as represented by the *sūtras* of Pātañjali and the Buddhist mysticism of *Yogācāra*. It cannot be denied that the two systems agree in many points and, while representing different aspects of the monistic idealism of India, both of these considered the ultimate truth dependent on our inner realization of the same, subjected the mystical process of meditation to an analysis which does not find its counterpart in any other literature and very often agreed even in the terminology they used. Another conclusion seems to be derived from the study of the system of the Maitreyanātha, *viz.*, that this yoga, this mental process that he so thoroughly analyses, is quite Indian in itself. Prof. Sylvain Lévi already suggested that it is quite possible that a man from Gandhāra, as Asaṅga was, had accepted foreign elements when building up his system. He pointed out that perhaps the great importance that the theory of the *samklesa* and *vyavadāna*

plays in the school of Asaṅga is a derivation from Manicheism, and he added that when we examine the dharma-system as expounded by Asaṅga, we cannot but be reminded of the intelligibles of the Neoplatonic School. I can hardly believe that. The *sukla* and *asita* karmas are to be found in the oldest records of Buddhism and the *dharmatā*-theory can be well explained with the indigenous elements that were at work in the country. The process of Indian speculation consists in finding out that absolute reality which is beyond the eternal flux of contingent experience, but at the same time is the ultimate reason of it. This reality only is, while things become.—Buddhism also formulating the principle of *śūnyatā* or that of *dharmatā*, renouncing its original pluralism, finds its way to monism.

Mysticism cannot but be monistic, and the system of Maitreya is chiefly mystic: knowledge of facts, *tarka*, *śrutajñāna*, are all necessary, but beyond them there must be the inner realization of the truth. The scope of his doctrine and his mystical practice is not *tarka* (Sūtrālambikāra I, 12) because by *tarka* we can reach only particular and incomplete knowledge, not the experience which is derived from the possession, as it were, of the thing itself (*dharmaśya prāptir, pratyātmam-vimuktijñānam*, v. Asaṅga ad Sūtrāl., I, 16). But even if I am not inclined to see any trace of foreign ideas in the mystical and philosophi-

cal system of Maitreya[nātha] and if, on the contrary, it appears to me to be purely Indian, this does not imply that I deny any trace of external influence on the literature that Maitreyanātha had at hand and commented upon. I have expressed elsewhere my opinion about Amitābha Maitreya, and Ajita Maitreya, who by his very name, reminds us of *Invictus Mithra*; to me it seems also to be almost certain that the Prajñā-literature has preserved traces of foreign elements. This is quite evident because the *prajñā* is not perhaps so old as it was generally supposed. There is for instance a passage in the Aṣṭasāhasrikā which deserves our attention. It is said there : *ime satpāramitāpratisamyuktāḥ sūtrāntāḥ tathā-gatasyātyayena dakṣiṇāpathe pracariṣyanti; dakṣiṇāpathāt punar eva vartanyām pracariṣyanti; vartanyāḥ punar uttarapathe pracariṣyanti* (p. 225). This seems to imply that the *prajñā* was elaborated first in the south and from there it was introduced into the east and then into the north. Haribhadra identifies the north with China, which theory was perhaps reasonable at a time when the intercourse between Buddhist India and China was frequent, but can hardly be acceptable when we refer to the very time in which the pāramitā was compiled. I cannot dissociate this passage of the Aṣṭasāhasrikā from the tradition according to which Nāgārjuna, the man who introduced the Prajñā-literature into India and had it revealed from the Nāgas, is

regarded as a man hailing from the South. Of course it is difficult at the present stage of our studies to advance any hypothesis, but it is quite possible that he was something more than the simple discoverer of the Prajñā. The Tibetan tradition knows of some Hīnayānists who accused him of having forged the sacred texts. At any rate the prajñā, as it is, goes back to a time in which there was a very great interchange of culture between India and other countries.

If we pass to the second book, *viz.*, the *Madhyāntavibhaṅga* or *Madhyāntavibhāga*, as it is in the Nepalese manuscript, we find the philosophical part of the system expounded with more detail. The technicalities of the path of meditation do not take the upper hand, but the prominent part is here given to the dogmatical and metaphysical aspects of the system. The name itself of the book deserves our notice. It is *madhyānta* and not *mādhyamika* or *madhyamaka* as the doctrine of Nāgārjuna was called. That the title of the book must have been chosen on purpose is proved by the fact that it appears as being characteristic of the school. So we know another treatise attributed to Asaṅga and now preserved in Chinese, which is called *Madhyāntanusārasāstra*. It embodies a commentary on the first kārikās of the Mādhyamikasāstras of Nāgārjuna. The difference is not, so at least it seems to me, of words only. It corresponds to a diversity of position as regards

some fundamental points. In fact, according to Nāgārjuna, the *madhyamā pratipat* is neither affirmation nor negation :

*astitvam ye tu paśyanti*

*nāstitvam cālpabuddhayah*

*bhāvānām te na paśyanti*

*draṣṭavyam upaśamam śivam*

In fact dharmas are neither existent nor non-existent, because they are śūnya in so far as they are *pratītyasamutpannāḥ* ; and this śūnyatā itself cannot be said to be *sat*, because any affirmation is the effect of *vikalpa*, so that śūnya can only be considered as the necessary implication of the logical antinomy of all dharmas. Śūnya is therefore the consequence of the *prasaṅga*, but it cannot become a *grāha*, because it would then be a *drṣṭi* ; and, as is known, *drṣṭi* is always in the plane of *avidyā*. For Maitreya things stand in a different way ; the śūnyatā becomes for him the *dharmatā* and this *dharmatā* is *sat* in so far as it represents the *ens realissimum* of the dharmas, but it is also *asat*, non-existent in so far as it denotes or rather it consists in the negation or in the privation of the *dvaya*, viz., subject and object, *grāhya* and *grāhaka*, always inherent in the contingent experience ; therefore, if we follow the definition of Sthiramati, it is real and unreal *yat śūnyam sat, yena śūnyam asat*.

This point has been summarized in his usual

concise way by Maitreya himself in the second kārikā of the book of which we are now speaking :

*Abhūtāparikalpo 'sti ; dvayaṁ tatra na vidyate ;  
Sūnyatā vidyate tatra ; tasyām api sa vidyate.*

which literally translated means : “ The unreal imagination is ; duality does not exist in it, but voidness exists in it and it also (viz., the unreal imagination) exists in this (viz., the voidness). ”

Let us try to understand the meaning of this kārikā, which embodies the fundamental tenets of the book, according to the traditional interpretation as handed down to Vasubandhu by Asaṅga and expounded in detail by Sthiramati.

This author of the tīkā gives various interpretations of the passage here concerned, but, though they differ in some small points, there is no doubt that they agree as regards the general feature of the doctrine expounded by Maitreya.

The first statement contained in the kārikā is meant to refute the extremist point of view of those Buddhists who denied any existence of a dharma, *sarvadharmaśūnya*. This is an *apavāda* and an *anta* and therefore it can hardly be considered as the right doctrine. If everything is śūnya it would be in fact impossible to strive after liberation ; therefore he says *abhūtāparikalpo 'sti*. Here *abhūtāparikalpa* consists in the wrong assumption of the existence and essence of objects which are not self-existent and therefore

are not in a condition of being perceived by a subject, in as much as they are mere *vijñānābhāsa*, phantasms of our mind. These *abhūtaparikalpas* are represented by an endless series of mental states which have no beginning, but will end with the *nirvāṇa* and are said therefore to correspond to the process of the *samsāra*. They are related to one another in a relation of cause and effect, and extend over the three *dhātus* and the three times : *atītānāgatavartamānā hetuphalabhbhūtās traidhātukā anādikālikā nirvāṇaparyavasānā samsārānurūpiṇas cittacaitasikā nirviśeṣenābhūtaparikalpāh*. But this *abhūtaparikalpa* is in fact devoid of any content, though *viśeṣarūpena* it appears as *dvaya*, subject and object, because this duality does not exist in it. There is no perceiver or perceived in it, it is in a condition of pure existence devoid of any qualification. It is *grāhyagrāhakatvarahitam vastumātram*. Therefore the *śūnyatā* exists in the *abhūtaparikalpa* ; and, if we are to follow the commentators, *śūnyatā* is to be taken here in the sense of *grāhya-grāhakarāhitatā*, absence of subject and object, that is, as pure negation. This statement is intended to refute the theory of those who did not admit the existence of the voidness and at the same time to maintain the possibility of the practice of the *vyavadāna* purification or suppression of *avidyā* and *kleśas*, because were we not to admit the existence of the *śūnyatā*, there would be no

support, *ālambana*, to meditation so that it would be impossible to proceed in the way of liberation. But, then, if the *sūnyatā*, that is the ultimate truth and the essence of everything, be existent and in the very *abhūtāparikalpa*, the necessary implication would be that *mokṣa* is at hand so that it could be attained by anybody without any effort. Moreover this *sūnyatā* said to be in the *abhūtāparikalpa* is not evident nor is it perceived. There must therefore be something which precludes its view. In order to solve these difficulties Maitreya adds that the *abhūtāparikalpa* or wrong ideation resides in it, which comes to saying that the *sūnyatā* is *āvṛta* covered or *kliṣṭa*, infected by the *abhūtāparikalpa* just as the ether is pure by its nature but is covered or defiled by dust. So the *sūnyatā* being covered by the *abhūtāparikalpa* is not evident and manifest ; this does not imply that it is non-existent. It must be realized through a process of purification *vyavadāna* which takes place in the *caryā* or conduct as already described according to the other treatise of Maitreya. In conclusion, according to Maitreya, as it is well established by his commentators, two things are *sat*, exist, the *abhūtāparikalpa* or wrong ideation and the *sūnyatā* or *dharmatā* of things, and these two are intimately related to each other. It appears to me that though this doctrine also is called the doctrine of the middle-path still there is much difference with-

the system as propounded by Nāgārjuna. For Nāgārjuna things are existent according to the *samvrtisatya*, but non-existent from the *paramārtha* point of view. We cannot say that they are or that they are not. But for Maitreya two things exist, as we saw, wrong ideation as well as *śūnyatā*. Nāgārjuna, as I pointed it out before, does not say that *śūnya* is *sat* but, which is rather different, that all dharmas are *śūnya*, void. For Nāgārjuna the voidness of dharmas has chiefly a logical significance. For Maitreya it acquires an ontological value. It is the dharmatā, it is *sat* because *śūnya* has not only a negative sense, it is not only *yena śūnyam*, but it is also *yat śūnyam*. As Sthiramati says—using an example that was largely employed by the Vedāntists, but which is also to be found in our text and in the commentary on the ālambanaparīkṣā by Diśnāga, the rope is *śūnya*, is void, as to the shape of snake that it may take under certain circumstances, but it is not *śūnya* in itself. *Rajju śūnyā sarpatvabhāvena tatsvabhāvatvābhāvāt sarvakālam śūnyāna tu rajjusvabhāvena*. This is a fundamental point of difference between Nāgārjuna and Maitreya, while the co-existence that Maitreya admits of the *abhūtāparikalpa* and of the *śūnyatā* or dharmatā strongly reminds us of the theory of the Mahāyāna *Sraddhotpādaśāstra* which equally asserts the co-existence of *avidyā* and the *citta*. This comes to saying that the error is existent *sub*

*specie aeternitatis* just as the *dharmatā*. 'This is unchangeable *in se*, but is covered by wrong ideation. When this wrong ideation is suppressed it shines again in its purity. But the *abhūtāparikalpa* also, though it can be suppressed, is real, because, being *anādikāla*, the realization of the *śūnyatā* is only possible through it and because the suppression of this wrong ideation is to be referred to a particular *santāna*, individual flux, only, while the *santānas* have no limit in space or time.

From what we have said it is evident that by the works of Maitreya our knowledge of early Yogācāra system and its relation to other schools of thought is greatly benefited.

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### III

## THE BEGINNING OF BUDDHIST LOGIC AND THE LOGICAL THEORIES OF MAITREYA[NATHA] AND ASAṄGA

Recent studies have shown the great importance of Buddhist logical theories and the great place that they occupy in the general evolution of Indian speculation. Without discussing here the problem whether Buddhist logic is prior to Brahminical logic, it cannot be denied that Buddhist thinkers tried to solve some of the fundamental problems of philosophy such as that of the sources and validity of our knowledge or that of the relation between subject and object with such a depth and originality as to anticipate in many points views expounded in recent times by Western thinkers. Unfortunately the works of the great masters in which these systems were elaborated have been swept away from India, with so many other monuments of Buddhist thought, so that we are obliged, when we want to get a clear idea of their doctrines from Sanscrit sources, to have recourse to the quotations and criticism to be found

in the Brahminical as well as in the Jaina dogmatical treatises. Many of these treatises owe their origin to the necessity, very early felt in non-Buddhist circles, of refuting the doctrines expounded by the Buddhist *ācāryas* and which, if accepted, would have meant a complete overthrow of the fundamental principles upon which Brahminical as well as Jaina systems were based. It is evident therefore that all these treatises are polemical and, as a rule, they belonged to a time when the antagonism between Buddhists and non-Buddhists was very strong. So that it is not always very easy to get an exact or unbiassed exposition of the theories held by the Buddhist doctors and it is much to be regretted that, even supposing that their ideas have always been exactly quoted and interpreted, we are confronted with mere fragments from which it is difficult to deduce a coherent idea of their system as a whole. Nor can we forget that there is some doubt even as regards the real attribution of the various doctrines to the different schools. Sometimes we find them attributed to the Sautrāntikas, sometimes to the Vijñānavādins, elsewhere to the Yogācāra. If we cannot identify the authors or even the school from which these quotations are supposed to have been taken, it is evident how difficult must be the reconstruction of the general logical and epistemological theories as expounded by the Buddhist *ācāryas* during a period of about ten

centuries. On the other hand, it is also clear that if we are in a condition to know exactly what were the doctrines of the Buddhist writers there refuted, it would be easier for us to understand their critics. So if we take a single instance, the *Nyāyavārttika* by Uddyotakara, which is a criticism of the system of Diṅnāga, can better be interpreted even in the minutest detail, if the complete system of the great Buddhist philosopher be better known. In fact, those who have a direct knowledge of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* or of the *Nyāyamukha*, the two principal works by Diṅnāga, can realize how the *Nyāyavārttika* is interspersed with quotations from these two works. Unfortunately Diṅnāga's treatises seem to have been lost in India. And there is some reason for this, because, as soon as Dharmakīrti commented upon his works in the *Pramāṇavārttika* and corrected his master in many points, marking upon him an undeniable advance, the logical system of Diṅnāga acquired an historical interest more than a living one. The attention of the Jaina and of the Brahminical philosophers was attracted by the criticism of Dharmakīrti, who had completed and perfected the views of his predecessors and represented the highest personality in the evolution of Buddhist logic. That is why after Dharmakīrti the doctrines of Diṅnāga are only occasionally referred to, passages eventually cited from his treatises being only those already known, as having been quoted

and refuted by the older philosophers such as Uddyotakara, Vidyānandī, Vācaspati. This implies that new commentators or polemical writers took these passages from their predecessors, but did not have access to the text itself.

Of Dharmakīrti we have, as is known, the *Nyāyabindu*, a short resumé in sūtra-form of the main points of his logical theories commented upon by one of his most renowned interpreters, Dharmottara. But I hear that in the Jaina bhāndārs which gave us recently that wonderful book which is the *Tattvasaṅgraha*, another work has been found. I mean the *Hetubindu* of the same author which was known so far only through its Tibetan translation. Some leaves of the same work containing a commentary on it have been found in Nepal and are now with me. From Nepal I brought also a leaf only of the *Pramāṇavārttika* of Dharmakīrti, containing the beginning of the first *Pariccheda*, and some pages of the commentary upon the same work by Devendrabuddhi of which we have a voluminous Tibetan translation in the *bsTan-agyu*. The page of the text is in Maithili characters and it shows that when the Mohamedan invasion compelled the pandits to take shelter in Nepal, the book of Dharmakīrti was still studied in India, though his system had already been summarized in simpler and more handy treatises by a lot of logicians who do not add very much, so far as I

can judge from the texts that I have read, to the theory of their great predecessor. So that, if we do not take into consideration all these subsequent *nibandhakāras* or commentators, who do not mark any substantial progress in the field of logical speculation, but are mere compilers, such as Moksākaragupta, Jitāri, etc., we must admit that the most constructive and brilliant period of Buddhist, and, I should say, of Indian logic begins with Diṅnāga and ends with Dharmakīrti. This period which covers about two centuries was one of the most active ones for Buddhist thinkers. There were large schools of logic flourishing all over India and even in Central Asia, where Yuan Chuang was engaged in logical discussions and Dharmagupta explained *Tarkaśāstras* in the monasteries of Kuchā. Problems of formal logic and epistemology were the subject of lively controversy in the monasteries and in the Universities.

All this is proved by the fact that Dharmakīrti, though the greatest of all, was not himself the author of those novelties that we find in his system, as compared with that of Diṅnāga. There was between him and his great predecessor a long series of masters who elaborated those doctrines that, on account of the scarcity of sources, we were before inclined to attribute to him. The names even of these masters are now unknown to us, but two at least can be recorded here. One is

Śaṅkarasvāmin, the author of the Nyāyapraveśa, which has also been recovered from the Jaina bhāndārs and was sometimes attributed to Diṅnāga, but certainly wrongly. Not only, in fact, the Chinese tradition, handed down to us by such a well informed writer as Yuan Chuang, clearly attributes the treatise to Śaṅkarasvāmin, but also, as can be perceived by anybody who compares this book with the works of Diṅnāga, such as the Pramāṇa-samuccaya or the Nyāyamukha there is a great *matabheda* between the two works, as regards the classification of the *pakṣābhāsas* and the *hetvābhāsas* which are more in Nyāyapraveśa than in all the works of Diṅnāga. That we are confronted with a new stage of the logical theories, which was the outcome of the speculative activity of the immediate followers of Diṅnāga, is proved, I think, by the fact that the more complex classification of the Nyāyapraveśa has been preserved, but also partly re-elaborated by Dharmakīrti, and that traces of it can be found in some other philosophical works belonging to the same time, which show the same logical scheme as that book and indicate therefore the great influence exercised by the system of Diṅnāga and further development made by his disciples. This is not the place to discuss and much less to solve the problem whether this Śaṅkarasvāmin, though called Bodhisattva by the

Chinese translator, was a Buddhist or rather if he is to be identified with the Vaiśeṣika master Saṅkarasvāmin quoted by Kamalaśīla, but the fact remains that the classification of the ābhāsas, as expounded in that book, corresponds almost exactly to the lists on the same subject to be found in other works, such as the Māṭharavṛtti, the Pramāṇanirṇaya and the Kāvyālaṅkāra. This fact is worth noticing, not only because it gives us some sure hint for determining the probable time in which the works referred to were compiled, but also because it indicates the great influence exercised by Buddhist centers upon logical theories generally accepted by thinkers and dārśanikas during the time that intervenes between Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrti. These doctrines seem to have received further elaboration by another philosopher, Iśvarakṛṣṇa, who is cited in Tibetan sources as the master of Dharmakīrti. Mention of him is made in some leaves from nyāya-works recovered in Nepal which support, therefore, the validity of the Tibetan tradition. Nor can we forget the commentary of K'uei-chi, the pupil of Yuen Chuang, who wrote down the explanations on the Nyāyapraveśa as orally made by his master, because this book gives also a fairly good idea of the great logical activity that took place in India about the time of the travel of the great Chinese pilgrim and shows that many of the theories that

seemed to appear for the first time in the Nyāya-bindu were in fact the result of a long elaboration that Dharmakīrti completed with great originality, no doubt, but also following in many places the footprints of his predecessors.

So that the fact seems well ascertained that the whole of the period which begins with Diññāga and ends with Dharmakīrti was the most powerful and original so far as logical and epistemological theories are concerned in the entire course of the evolution of Buddhist thought. We may also say that, during this time and chiefly through Diññāga, nyāya undergoes a fundamental change. In fact older nyāya the model of which Diññāga himself follows in his early works such as the Nyāyamukha, is chiefly formal logic, it is concerned with syllogism and its laws ; in other words it gives the rules that we must follow when we discuss dogmatical subjects with our opponents. New logic has a much wider bearing. It insists necessarily upon the theory of syllogism, but we are no longer confronted with a mere heuristic. The syllogism is no longer purely apodiptic, but it is based upon the deduction of a particular case from a synthetical judgment. That is why epistemology plays such a large part in the new nyāya treatises ; the relation between subject and object, the validity of our sources of knowledge and the real nature of the object form the most important topics discussed in the new manuals inspired by

the idealistic system of the Yogācāras or of the Vijnānavādins, the main feature of which is to deny the objective reality to things of our experience. This means that the object is not independently existent in itself, but that every object of our knowledge is given its existence by our mind.

But now the question may arise: Was Diññāga the first to elaborate the subtle logical theories which we find fully developed in the Nyāyamukha and in the Pramāṇasamuccaya, or was he a systematiser, as original as he might have been, of even older doctrines that received by him a better formulation? Our researches point it out unmistakably that Diññāga had many predecessors who had long ago treated logical problems though without that scientific and philosophical accuracy which is proper to Diññāga. Chinese and Tibetan translations supply us with very important information as regards the logical activity of Buddhist centers before the time of Diññāga and what we gather from them is sufficient enough to show that formal logic was greatly developed in Buddhist schools at least from the time of Maitreya. This point deserves our mention because if we depend on the authority of those texts which enjoy the reputation of being, as a whole, fairly older than the others, we find that *hetuvidyā* or *tarka* is blamed. It is one of those sciences in which the monk must not

indulge. The *tārkika* does not seem to have been held in a better reputation among the Buddhists than among the compilers of the *Mahābhārata* where also the *Tārkikas* are referred to with contempt. But things changed little by little. The time of the *prakaraṇas*, exegesis, follows the time of the *pravacanas*; the points of view are many and often discordant. In that freedom of interpreting the texts which was always left to the believers and which represents one of the most characteristic features of Buddhism and under the necessity of defending one's own views from the opposite theories, Buddhist as well as non-Buddhist, the debates on technical or dogmatical points grew in importance. The time which saw the rise of *śāstras* and *prakaraṇas* was also the time in which Buddhists began to turn their attention to *vāda* and to its rules. There were always people who were *dharmaṇusārin*; for them the holy teaching was quite enough, but others were *parīksakas*, they could not believe until their mind also was fully satisfied, so that, at a rather early time, we find the theory well established that faith rests upon two things—*āgama* or holy words and *yukti* or logical reasons. This implies that in the Buddhist schools a great place was given to logical discussions upon the theories held by the various currents that we find fully individualized at the beginning of Christian era.

Buddhist logic was originated as a series of rules for *vivāda* and this explains why the first specimens of this logic, which have been handed down to us, have the appearance of manuals containing rules about the behaviour of the disputant in the course of the discussion, but the logical elements contained there are rarely something more than pure heuristic. They did not present, at the very beginning, any connected system, but were a kind of catalogue or *vademecum* very akin to *tantrayukti*, known to us through the *arthaśāstra*, and even medical works such as *Caraka* and *Suśruta*. The first specimen of these catalogues is contained in the *Yoga-caryā-bhūmi-sāstra* attributed to Maitreya or Asāṅga, a work which I referred to in the first of my lectures. We find here a full chapter dedicated to *vāda* and divided into eight different items : *vāda* in itself ; the place where the speech is made, *vādādhikaraṇa* ; the points of discussion, *vādasthāna* ; the adornment of the speech, *vādālankāra* ; fallacy, *vacanadoṣa* ; defeat, *vādanigraha* ; the starting point of the speech, *vādaniḥsarana* ; characteristics by which a speech is appreciated *vāde bahukāradharmāḥ*. If we except the third item, viz., *vādasthānam*, we can hardly find in the other sections something which may really be considered as pertaining to logic, as we understand it now. At most we are confronted with theories and hints that

have a large bearing upon the prehistory, we could say, of the alaṅkāra that is of a science which was also strictly dependent upon vivāda and the connection of which with logical theories was never forgotten.

According to *Yoga-caryā-bhūmi-śāstra* and other cognate works a speech is to be considered as *alankṛta* when it shows perfect knowledge of the speaker's system as well as of the opposite views. Moreover the language of the vādin must be perfect and this perfection can only be attained if five proprieties are present in it. It must in fact be devoid of any rustic expression, be easy, evident, coherent, possessing a good meaning. Another of the fundamental elements of a vāda is considered to be the *vaiśāradya*, fearlessness, which is held in Mahāyāna as one of the most peculiar qualities of the Buddha and of the Bodhisattva and consists in that feeling of self-confidence which is not shattered even in a big or hostile *pariṣat*. It must be accompanied by *dhīratā*—firmness and the speech itself must possess those characteristics which will be esteemed and attractive. This gives the author the opportunity to enumerate a list of 27 *praśamsā-gunas*, good qualities of *vāda*. These *praśamsā-gunas* or *vākyapraśamsās* are known to us by other sources also. I quote Carakasamhitā in the section dedicated to the *vādamaryādā* and the *Upāyahṛdaya* attributed to Nāgarjuna

and about which we shall have to speak in these lectures. But the catalogue of Maitreya gives the impression to contain older ideas. The *Vākyapraśamsā* in Caraka is of five kinds and has already been established having recourse to the logical coherence of a sentence. It is *anyūna* and *anadhika*, which implies the theory of syllogism as composed of a fixed number of *avayavas* ; it must possess a meaning, *arthavat* ; it must not be incoherent, *anapārthaka*, nor contradictory *aviruddha*. So also the *Upāyahṛdaya* which follows with little difference and small additions the classification of Caraka. Of course all these things will disappear in a further stage, but there is no doubt that they are worth noticing, in so far as they contain the first attempt at logically elaborating the data of the oldest *vivāda*-manuals. But in our text no such attempt is to be found. Its enumeration of the *praśamsāguṇas* contains very little which can be considered as pertaining to logic ; it embodies qualities that have relation to the behaviour of the disputant more than to speech itself : no bodily fatigue to be shown in the discussion, no stammering, no pain or impediment in the throat. On the other hand cleverness and promptitude of mind such as *pratibhāna*, etc., kindness towards the opponent, absence of partiality, etc., are insisted upon. The same is the impression that we receive when we examine the fifth section of the same book, concerned with

the *vādanigraha*. We learn from later catalogues that this was a point discussed with full detail, because it was of the greatest importance to know what were those defective ways of arguing which marked a well definite inferiority of one of the disputants, and were therefore considered as a sufficient proof of his incapability to carry on his discussion and to defend his thesis. All the Nigraha-section of Maitreya or Asaṅga's work is divided into three main items: *vacanasannyāsa*, which corresponds to the *pratijñāsannyāsa* of the Nyāyasūtras and consists in admitting that one's own thesis is wrong and that of the adversary is the right one. It can be of thirteen kinds, "my thesis is wrong," "your thesis is right," etc. The second item can be compared with the *vikṣepa* of the catalogue of the Nyāyasūtras, though it includes some aspects which cannot be considered as properly belonging to it, but rather shows some similarities with other *nigrahasthānas*. *Vikṣepa* can only be called the first example given by the author in our text and which happens when somebody, perceiving that his arguments are wrong, and not knowing how to maintain any longer his thesis, tries to avoid the discussion saying that he has something else to do, etc. The other case alluded to and which happens when the opponent has nothing to reply and keeps silence, corresponds to the *apratibhāna* of the Nyāyasūtras. But when our authors consider

irritability, conceitedness, etc., as varieties of the same *nigraha*, or when they say that the same happens when the opponent, unable to overcome the speaker, reveals some secrets of his life which the other does not like to make known, we are confronted with aspects of *nigraha* which do not have any connection whatever with logic, while the long list of examples shows also that casuistry was taking the place of the theory not yet formulated. We find the same indecision as regards the section dedicated to *vacanadoṣa*, which side by side with attempts at logical classification, anticipating the lists of later manuals, contains much which has little connection with Logic. So *vacanadoṣa* is considered to happen when one speaks at random or when words and expressions are suggested by anger, or when they lack cohesion; but at the same time mention of the *nyūna* and *adhika*, of the *sādhyasama*, of the *siddhasādhya*, of the *apārthaka* of the *avijñātārtha*, or of the *prāptakāla* is to be found in the list of *Yogacaryā-bhūmi*. Jātis, deserving particular notice, are referred to as a variety of the *vyartha*, meaningless; though no further detail is given, the very fact that we find them mentioned here shows that jāti-catalogues were already known at the time of Maitreya or Asaṅga. The seventh and the eighth class do not add very much and insist either on the necessity of *vaiśāradya* or *pratibhāna* for those who are engaged in a discussion or point out that

before undertaking a *vivāda* one must always compare his abilities and his chances of success with those of the opponents and to consider whether the *pariṣat* is friendly and impartial.

Though all these *elenchoi*, as to use the proper Greek word, have only an indirect connection with logic, still they deserve our notice because they are the first attempts at *nyāya* that we find in Buddhist literature which testify at the same time to the changes that were slowly creeping into Buddhism. *Vivāda* is no longer condemned, but it is considered as one of the sciences that the Bodhisattva must master and its model is taken from the lists contained in the *Tantra-yukti*, the very kernel from which both *Nyāya* and *Alaṅkāra* seem to have developed.

We have left aside for the moment the third section of the *vivāda* chapter of *Yoga-caryā-bhūmi* which we are studying. But it is just in the third item that we find definite *nyāya*-theories treated and discussed. It is perhaps the first document which has been handed down to us in which syllogism and *pramāṇas* have been dealt. It deserves therefore a careful investigation.

## IV

THE LOGICAL THEORIES OF MAITREYA-  
[NĀTHA] AND ASAṄGA

We saw that the author of the *Yoga-caryā-bhūmi* was the first man to include *vivāda* among the subjects to be known by the Bodhisattva. The Bodhisattva had become the defender of the faith. The polemical activity of the followers of the various sects, the attacks of the orthodoxy, the importance given to *yukti* as an *upāya* to reaching faith, *adhimukti*, the growth of the *prakaraṇas* induced the Buddhist masters to draw their attention to *Tarkavidyā*, which had been, for a long time, considered with fame. They freely accepted the *Tantrayukti*-rules, circulating in India, and gave them a Buddhist garb, by emphasising the importance of some peculiarly Buddhist qualities or virtues, such as *upāya-kauśalatā*, *vaiśāradya*, etc. We have also given a resumé of the fundamental ideas and classifications laid down in the *Yoga-caryā-bhūmi-śāstra*. But we have left aside on purpose the third section of his chapter on *vivāda*, because our intention is to study it in full detail. It is in fact there that we

find the earliest elaboration of the doctrine of syllogism and of the theory of the *pramāṇas*. The first thing that we must note is that the syllogistic process is here divided into two parts : one is called the *probandum*, *sādhya*, the other is the proof itself, that is those dialectical methods as well as those subjective sources of knowledge by which we can attain to certainty about a notion. This implies that the notion to be proved is also considered as independent of the syllogism ; it is to be first expounded as the subject of discussion in the beginning of the *vivāda* and then to be formulated again as the first member of the real syllogism. In the first case it is a mere *probandum* ; in the second case it is considered as an inseparable part of the *sādhana* itself. This theory seems to have been peculiar to the Buddhists and it was accepted even by the author of the *Vādavidhi* as we can infer from the criticism advanced by Uddyotakara against it. This particular notion of the *sādhya* deserves notice because it is to be considered as the basis of the theory of *pakṣa* which, as we know, was peculiar to Buddhist logicians. For Maitreya, Asaṅga and Vasubandhu the *sādhya* or *pakṣa* is independent of the *sādhana*. The *pratijñā*, thesis, is in fact the formulation of that same *sādhya* in the process of syllogism. It is *sādhya-bhidhāna* as the author of *Vādavidhi* says. Diṅnāga, on the other hand, seems to have anticipated the objections of

Uddyotakara in so far as he suppresses the *pratijñā*, the place of which is taken by *pakṣa* itself.

According to *Yoga-caryā-bhūmi* this *sādhya* or *probandum* is twofold. It is either *svabhāva* or *vīśeṣa*, that is, it contains a judgment either about the very essence of a thing, or about the possibility of predicating a special attribute of it. In the first case we can only say that the given subject, *dharmin*, is existent or non-existent, while in the second we either affirm or deny that a given quality belongs to the subject. Asaṅga reproduces the same theory in his *Abhidharma-saṅgītiśāstra* and *Sthiramati* commenting upon this text in his *Abhidharmasamyuktasaṅgīti* gives two examples of the two varieties of the *sādhya*. A suitable example for the first case, when the *sādhya* is only *svabhāva*, is a proposition such as the following : “ the ātman is, the ātman is not; ” of the second one : the ātman is all-pervading, the ātman is non-eternal.”

Not less interesting is the discussion concerned with the *sādhana* that is with the syllogism proper in which we find some peculiar features that cannot be traced, so far as I know, in other texts. The *sādhana*, syllogism, or process by which a particular notion is proved is considered by our text to be eightfold. On hearing this one should be inclined to connect this theory with that of the older masters of logic

according to whom the syllogism is composed of many members. Such were in fact the doctrine expounded by Bhadrabāhu in the Daśavaikālikaniryukti and the one referred to and criticised by Vātsyāyana in his Nyāyabhāṣya, though there is no apparent relation between the theory alluded to by the Bhāṣyakāra and the view held by the Jaina doctor. But by a closer investigation we realize that no such connection is to be found. The doctrine of syllogism expounded by Maitreya is in fact based upon a three-*avayava-sādhana*.

In fact the eight constituents of the *sādhana* are so enunciated by the Yoga-caryā-bhūmi-śāstra : *pratijñā*; *hetu*, reason; *drṣṭānta*, example; *sādharmya*, homogeneity; *vaidharmya*, heterogeneity; *pratyakṣa*; *anumāna*; *āgama*. It is evident that the last three cannot be considered as real members of the syllogism ; they are only *pramāṇas*, sources of knowledge. In a sense they are certainly *sādhana*, inasmuch as it is by them that we can attain to a valid notion. But they are not really part of a syllogism. They have a quite subjective value in so far as it is by them that we are convinced of some particular truths and therefore they are quite different from the *sādhana*, the purpose of which is to convince others. The last three members belong therefore to that process which we call *svārthānumāna*, inference by one's own self, which is based on the inductive process, includes direct perception as the ultimate

foundation of our experiences, and can always be convalidated by the authority of the holy texts. In other words the inductive process cannot be isolated from the other elements of our reasoning which are ultimately only one in the synthetical activity of our mind.

This is also the foundation upon which syllogism depends, because no conclusion attained by formal logic can be considered as valid, if it were contradicted by direct experience, judgment and general and well established truths. Though, therefore, syllogism is dependent on the *pramāṇas*, still it is impossible to include the *pramāṇas* among the real members of the *sādhana*. So that five members are left to us for our consideration. But it is evident that even in this case there is but a formal analogy with the five-*avayavas*-theory accepted, as is known, by the *Naiyāyikas* and expounded in the *Nyāyasūtras*. In fact the *sādharmya* and the *vaidharmya* referred to in the list of the *Yoga-caryā-bhūmi-śāstra*, which we are considering, cannot be taken as but denoting the different aspects of the example, *viz.*, the positive and the negative example, though, as we shall see, they have nothing which may allow us to infer that the *trirūpa*-theory was known to the *Yoga-caryā-bhūmi-śāstra* and in general to Asaṅga. Anyhow in this book we do not find any mention of the other two *avayavas* of the syllogism as expounded by the *Nyāyasūtras* and

the *Tarkaśāstra* ; I mean the *upanaya* and the *nigamana*. This fact gives the logical theories of the *Yoga-caryā-bhūmi-śāstra* a peculiar aspect, because its classification stands quite alone in the Buddhist literature connected with *nyāya* now accessible to us. In fact there is another group of works written by Asaṅga containing a resumé of logical doctrines.

Though there is a general agreement, except in some few cases, between the *Yoga-caryā-bhūmi* and this second group of works the treatment of the syllogism is just one of those points where we cannot find complete accordance. In fact while the *Āryapravacana*, which is only a summary of the doctrines expounded in the huge *Yoga-caryā-bhūmi-śāstra* contains the same theories about *sādhana* as those already expounded, in the *Abhidharmasaṅgīti*, commented upon by Sthiramati, we find that the five-*avayava*-theory has been accepted. In this book, instead of the *sādharmya* and *vaidharmya*, Asaṅga gives as members of a syllogism the *upanaya* and the *nigamana*. That is to say, in this work Asaṅga strictly follows the *Nyāyasūtras* and the *Tarkaśāstra*. It is difficult to explain in a satisfactory way this diversity of statements concerning the same subject by one and the same author. If we think of the general evolution of Buddhist *nyāya* it would appear logical to consider the three-*avayava*-theory, as expounded in the

Yoga-caryā-bhūmi-śāstra, as a progress on the other. If this could be proved it would show that the prose section of the Yoga-caryā-bhūmi was written after the Abhidharmasaṅgīti. So that the attribution of the same work to Maitreya would become impossible. But such a conclusion does not appear to be definitive. In fact in Buddhist texts which perhaps are more recent than Maitreya such as the Tarkaśāstra, identified in some quarters with the Vādavidhi attributed to Vasubandhu, there is still the theory of the five-*avayava*-syllogism. Moreover there is no doubt that the treatment of the *sādharmya* and *vaidharmya* in the Yoga-caryā-bhūmi-śāstra is still very imperfect and so it seems difficult to see in it a step towards the *trirūpa*-theory. So it is dangerous to apply the criterion of evolution to these theories and to fix their probable dates by merely basing our arguments on it. The fact remains that if we study all the materials we have at our disposal, it seems that many schools and currents of logic, each one with its peculiar doctrines, were in existence much before Diṅnāga, and that even at an early date, such as that of Maitreya and Asaṅga, a large variety of currents is traceable.

But what are in detail the ideas of Maitreya and Asaṅga on the various topics that we have enunciated ? Let us begin with the *pramāṇas*. These *pramāṇas* are three, *viz.*, *pratyakṣa*, *anumāna* and *āgama*. This list is worth noticing. In fact

it marks a further step in the elaboration of logical doctrines among Buddhist schools. It is known that Nāgārjuna enumerates in his *Vigrahavyāvartanī* four *pramāṇas* as the Nyāya-sūtras, but of course this does not mean that he accepts them because for the mādhyamika-stand-point the notion of *pramāṇa*, as well as any other notion, is antinomic and self-contradictory. But another work very old, perhaps older than Maitreya, attributed by Chinese sources to Nāgārjuna, though it has certainly nothing to do with the Mādhyamika teacher, I mean the *Upāyahṛdaya*, admits four *pramāṇas*, *viz.*, the same as those we find in Nyāyasūtras. Now in Maitreya and Asaṅga the *pramāṇas* have been reduced only to three, that is, *upamāṇa* has been suppressed, we do not know on what ground. But it is almost certain that Maitreya and Asaṅga did not see in it anything more than a variety of *anumāṇa*, just as the Vaiśeṣikas and Diṅnāga did. But Maitreya could not suppress the *āgama* as it was done later on by Diṅnāga and his school. The *āgama* is for many a source of knowledge, quite independent of the others. This point of view is not peculiar to Maitreya and his immediate followers, nor was it completely superseded, as it is generally believed, on the authority of Mādhabavācārya, by the criticism of Diṅnāga. It is not true that every Buddhist school maintained the validity of two *pramāṇas* only, *viz.*, *pratyakṣa* and *anumāṇa*.

Though, certainly, this was the general and more common view, the school of Maitreya, the Yogācāras, seems to have insisted on this theory long after this master; so we find the three-pramāṇas accepted and supported by Sthiramati, whom Chinese sources consider as following the old logical ideas, and in more recent times by Vimuktisena and Haribhadra the commentators of the *Abhisamayālankāra*. So, at least among the Yogācāras, there is no doubt that the three-pramāṇa-doctrine survived for a long time. We must therefore consider as too general the statement which attributes to the Buddhists only two pramāṇas. But what are these pramāṇas and how were they understood by Maitreya and Asaṅga?

Let us begin with direct perception. This must have three fundamental aspects, according to the *Yoga-caryā-bhūmi-sāstra* and the works related to it, that is to say, it must be evident and immediate, *aparokṣa*, it must not be mixed with ideation and, at last, it must be devoid of error. I do not need to insist upon the importance of this definition. We find, in fact, in it all the elements which will be accepted by Dharmakīrti, while, on the other hand, Diṅnāga before him had proposed a somewhat different definition, abolishing the condition of its being *abhrānta*. In other words we find in our text the confirmation of what I said before, *viz.*, that the new elements that we see in Dharmakīrti's works cannot always be

attributed to him. It is even possible that Dharmakīrti and Diññāga belonged to two different schools or currents, which fact seems to be pointed out by the circumstance that the sources of the logical theories common to both are by the orthodox or Jaina critics sometimes called Sautrāntika, sometimes Yogācāra, sometimes Vijñānavāda. Though their logic developed more or less on the same lines, it is quite possible that the metaphysical tenets of the schools to which they belonged were different. We shall not therefore be astonished when we see that in some particular points even their logical tenets differed and that in the case of the characters of perception the difference of opinion between Diññāga and Dharmakīrti was derived from a divergent metaphysical standpoint, is clearly indicated by Mallivādin. As a matter of fact, many tendencies are included under the general name of Vijñānavāda and Yogācāra and still very little is known about the main and characteristic features of them; as a whole Diññāga is more akin to Vijñānavāda than Dharmakīrti, who seems strictly connected with the Yogācāras.

The investigation of the exact meaning of the various terms employed in the definition of direct perception as given in our text will shed some light upon the problem of the history of Buddhist logical theories. It is in fact evident that it was somewhat difficult to insert the

*pratyakṣa*-doctrine in a system like Buddhism in which the reality of external things is not admitted, but in which we have, at least as it appears from the dogmatical treatises, a series of internal and external moments running parallel. So that the perception of a thing is nothing else than the particular internal *vijñāna* corresponding to a single *rūpa-āyatana*. This is the theory which remains in the definition of *pratyakṣa* as given by the *Vādavidhi* and according to which *pratyakṣa* is *tato 'rthāt*, that is, the *vijñāna* deriving from the five *kāyas* or supports of the subjective representation of the various objects. This doctrine which is more in accordance with the dogmatics of the *abhidharma*-treatises was also expounded in the *Abhidharmasaṅgīti*, if we are to judge from the explanation given by Sthiramati, for whom perception is the very thing rightly perceived and devoid of error. "The very thing," says Sthiramati, is here used in order to show that when we see a pot, which is generally believed to be the object of our direct preception, still we have only the direct perception of the various elementary constituents of a pot, such as *rūpa*, etc. The notion of pot as a whole is therefore the result of the synthetical activity of our mind. It is therefore *prajñapti*. Moreover—he adds—"perceived" is used in order to indicate that in the very act of perceiving there must be no obstruction, while the further determination: "devoid of error" shows

that the perception of a mirage which is the consequence of *bhrānti*, etc., cannot be considered as a perception. This definition of perception, as we find it in the *Abhidharma-saṅgīti* and in the *Abhidharma-samyuktasaṅgīti*, gives the impression of being more coherent and strictly philosophical than that contained in the *Yoga-caryā-bhūmi-sāstra* in which a large part is usually given to mystical theories and to those classifications and exemplifications which are characteristic of this book and seem to point out that the author was trying to combine the old and the new and had not yet reached a synthetical vision of the problem that he was examining. We saw that according to this book perception must be *aparokṣa*. This means that it is derived from the senses when they are uninjured and that it anticipates *manaskāra*. It can be based either on analogy or on heterogeneity and it presupposes proximity. The first two items suggest to us the *yogijñāna*; in fact it is said that perception is analogous when the *indriyas*, senses, perceive things belonging to the same sphere of existence, and that perception is heterogeneous when they perceive things belonging to a superior sphere. The obstruction which must be absent is of four kinds. It is derived either from darkness and ignorance or from being hidden as by the force of *mantras* or from being overpowered as the small by the great or from bewilderment, *moha*, such as *māyā*, *taimirika*, etc. This implies

that the author of the *Yoga-caryā-bhūmi-śāstra* knew the theory of the āvaraṇas which was discussed very early in Indian schools and of which we find, as is known, the first traces in the *Mahābhāṣya* of Patañjali. But though the classification of Patañjali shows a certain similarity with the list of the āvaraṇas given by Caraka and the Sāṅkhya-texts and that of the Śatasāstra, our enumeration seems to be quite independent, not only as regards the number of the āvaraṇas which are four instead of eight, but also as regards terminology and the principle itself of the classification. The second term in the definition of *pratyakṣa* implies that it must be devoid of any imaginative construction of our mind ; it seems therefore to anticipate the *kalpanāpodham* of Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrti. Then it must be *abhrānta*, devoid of seven kind of errors ; *saṃjñābhrānti*, to consider an object to be one which it is not, *atasmin tad* ; *sāṅkhyābhrānti*, to see the complex in the elementary, *e.g.*, two moons instead of one as in the case of a *taimirika* ; *ākārabhrānti* as when one sees a wheel in a whirling fire; *varṇabhrānti* to see as yellow what is not yellow; *karmabhrānti* to attribute a particular action to what does not act or acts in a different way, *e.g.*, the appearance of movement in the trees when one runs very first; *drṣṭibhrānti*, to persist in the errors already enumerated and to believe that these erroneous visions are real ; *cittabhrānti*, to rejoice in these errors.

It is evident that these two last items have very little to do with the real character of an erroneous perception. They are only valuable so far as the practice is concerned and they mark, as it were, the passing of pure logic into the *caryā* of the Buddhist. We shall not insist therefore upon them. So that we may say that in fact we have in the *Yoga-caryā-bhūmi-sāstra* five categories only of *bhrānti*. Now if we do not take into consideration the first one (*samjñābhrānti*) which is not a class by itself but represents the very foundation of all other *bhrāntis*, because all errors depend on the perception of something which is really different from its appearance, *atasmin tat*, we have only four fundamental *bhrāntis* which exactly correspond to those enumerated by Dharmakīrti in the *Nyāyabindu* and to their examples as illustrated by Dharmottara. This fact deserves mention because it shows once more the relations of Dharmakīrti chiefly with Asaṅga and Vasubandhu which we have already noted in other places. Nor is it useless to note that the classification of the direct perception in three classes the *rūpendriyavijñāna*, the *manovij* and the *yogi-pratyakṣavij* as known to Diṅnāga, Dharmakīrti and others, who add also the *svasamvedanāpratyakṣa*, is anticipated by our texts which tell us that the *pratyakṣa* is *rūpendriya*, *manas*, *laukika* and *suddha*. Since the *laukika* is said to include the first two, we have in fact a threefold perception

which corresponds to that of later treatises with the only exception of the *svasamvedana*. So by this study of the logical section of the *Yogacaryā-bhūmi-śāstra* we are now in a condition to have a fairly good idea of the very beginning of nyāya doctrines in Buddhist centers and to realize how many of the elements that appear in the later and more systematical treatises had already been anticipated by a long series of masters. Up to recent times the *Nyāyabindu* was used as the only book of reference for individualizing the various logical theories considered to be specially Buddhist and many conclusions were drawn about the chronology of works from the mere similarity of the doctrines therein contained with those of other texts. It is evident that all these conclusions must be revised, because what seemed, on account of the scarcity of the material at our disposal, to be found for the first time in Dharmakīrti was in fact anticipated long ago before him.

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## V

## THE BEGINNING OF BUDDHIST LOGIC

We have seen, in our past lecture, how the Yogacaryābhūmiśāstra understands direct perception. Now we must expound the theory of inference, *anumāna*. This is defined as the discrimination of an object through the activity of our mind and it is considered to be of five kinds. It may be either : a) *nimittānumāna*, which depends on the knowledge, already obtained, of a relation between two things, e.g., smoke and fire, b) *svabhāvānumāna*, when we infer unperceived existence from a present perceived existence ; this kind of *anumāna* happens for instance when we infer the existence of a car after having seen only a wheel of it. c) *karmānumāna*, when, from the perception of an action we infer the agent of the action itself. So when we see a motionless object from afar we infer that it is a tree, but if we perceive that it moves we infer that it is a man. d) *dharmānumāna* ; this is the case when we know that many dharmas or attributes are related to one another and must therefore be predicated of the same object. Then, if we perceive one of

these dharmas in an object we infer that the others also must be present there. e) *kāryakāranānumāna*, that is inference of notions which are related as cause and effect. This classification which we find again in the same treatise, when the five aspects of the example or rather of the homogeneity, upon which the example, as a member of a syllogism, depends, is worthy of notice. In fact I do not know of any other text in which this same treatment of inference is expounded. It is in fact evident that very little relation can be found between the classification of the *anumāna* into five varieties as enumerated in the *Yogacaryābhūmiśāstra* and the five kinds of inference referred to in the *Vaiśeṣikasūtras*, that is *kāryakāraṇa*, *saṃyogi*, *viyogi*, *virodhi*, *saṃavāya*. But we find in *Dharmakīrti* two of the items of the *Yogacaryābhūmi*, I mean the *svabhāva* and *kārya* though, of course, there is a gulf of difference between the two authors as regards the systematical and philosophical treatment of the subject.

The school of *Maitreya* and *Asaṅga* adds to these two *pramāṇas*, as we saw, the *āgama*, authority of the sacred texts. The *Abhidharmasaṅgīti* and the *Abhidharmasaṃyuktasaṅgīti* state in this connection that *āgama* is not contradictory to the other two *pramāṇas*. This comes to say that the *āgama* receives its validity either from direct perception or from inference ; this statement implies that it must not be contrary to reason, so that it

is implicitly given a subordinate place in comparison with the two other *pramāṇas*. In fact Dīnnāga does not accept it as a particular *pramāṇa* but as being included in the others. This point of view came to be generally accepted in Buddhist schools, with the exception of the strict followers of Maitreyanātha system.

According to our treatise, when a notion is contradicted by the two aspects of the example or by the three *pramāṇas*, it is wrong, so that for the author of the *Yogacaryābhūmiśāstra* the fundamental logical error consists in the *viruddha*, the contradiction. This logical contradiction which therefore inficiates the validity of a notion can have two aspects : either the notion reached by our argument is uncertain, that is it is not the only one which may be derived as a conclusion from our syllogism and then we have the *aniścita* or it is a *petitio principi*, the *sādhyasama*.

These are the contents of the logical section of the *Yogacaryābhūmiśāstra* and of the other treatises dogmatically connected with it and written by Asaṅga. A further step in logic was made by the great doctor Vasubandhu. According to the tradition he was, as is known, the younger brother of Asaṅga and was converted by him to *Mahāyāna* after having been a follower of *Hīnayāna*. It follows that the enormous literary activity of Vasubandhu may in fact be divided into two periods : the *hīnayānist* as represented for instance by the *Abhidharmakośa*

which with its leaning towards Sautrāntika-views anticipated, as it were, his conversion to Mahāyāna and the mahāyānist when he systematised the Vijñaptimātratā doctrine. We cannot say to what period we may attribute the logical treatises of Vasubandhu, but the fact that nyāya was incorporated for the first time, so far as we know, in the works of Maitreya seems to support the view that the nyāya treatises of Vasubandhu belong to the period following his conversion to Mahāyāna dogmatics. What are these works of Vasubandhu? If we are to follow the Chinese sources represented by K'uei-chi and Shen-t'ai, the commentators respectively of the Nyāyapravesa and of the Nyāyamukha and the disciples of Yuan-chwang, three works on logic were written by Vasubandhu. One was the Vādavidhi, the other Vādavidhāna, the third the Vādahṛdaya. The Chinese tradition, which rests on the information of the great Chinese pilgrim who was himself very well acquainted with nyāya is neither contradicted nor supported by the Indian tradition. In fact we know that the Vādavidhi is quoted by Uddyotakara in his Nyāyavārttika, but without giving the name of its author. Nor does Vācaspati attribute to Vasubandhu any of the passages of the Vādavidhi cited in the Nyāyavārttika which have their correspondent in the Pramāṇasamuccaya of Dīnāga. About the Vādavidhāna, quoted also by Uddyotakara, we do not

know very much, except that the definition of the *pratijñā* which is given there reminds us of some terms that Sthiramati uses in his commentary on the *Abhidharmasaṅgīti* when discussing the same subject. About the *Vādahṛdaya* no information can be gathered. There is in Chinese, it is true, a work on *vāda* which we have alluded to very often and which is called *Upāyahṛdaya*, but since no mention of Vasubandhu is made as regards this work, but on the contrary it was in some quarters attributed to Nāgārjuna, we cannot state any relation whatever between the *Vādahṛdaya* and this supposed *Upāyahṛdaya*. But if we have recourse to the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* we find that the *Vādavidhi* is not attributed to Vasubandhu. Anyhow considering that so little is known about logical theories before Diṅnāga and that this *Vādavidhi* enjoyed among the naiyāyikas a vast reputation before this philosopher, so that the theories therein expounded are refuted not only by the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, but even by Uddyotakara and are referred to in two different places in the logical section of *Kāvyālaṅkāra*, we realize that the discovery of such a book in Sanscrit or in a translation would benefit immensely our knowledge of Pre-Diṅnāga Buddhist logic. There is of course in Chinese a work which is considered to be a *Tarkaśāstra*. It is a fragment in which *chala*, *jāti* and *nigrahasthānas* are discussed. If we are to follow the Chinese tradition this text enjoyed great

notoriety in India and Central Asia at the time of Paramārtha who even wrote a commentary upon it. It was evidently the manual used for mastering the technicalities of the *vivāda* or *vāda* which were necessary for those discussions which at that time took place not only between Buddhists and non-Buddhists, but also among the various Buddhist schools themselves. Now there is a tendency to identify this book with the Vādavidhi and to ascribe it to Vasubandhu. The fact that it was translated by such an early translator as Paramārtha and that it was such an authoritative text would support this view. I may add also that the catalogue of the *jātis* as given in the Chinese text, agrees almost fully with the same catalogue referred to by Diññāga in the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*. But it must also be noted that I do not find anywhere in the Chinese sources a definite and credible mention of this work as being that of Vasubandhu and while we know from Ku'ei-chi that the *sādhana* or syllogism as expounded by Vasubandhu consisted of three members only, our text enumerates the same five members as the Nyāyasūtras. Therefore, though I do not exclude the idea that the Chinese text may be a fragment of the Vādavidhi, which hypothesis would be more probable if the Vādavidhi be not by Vasubandhu, still I do not think that the data at our disposal may allow us to be absolutely categorical on this point. Anyhow whatever the case might be it is certain that in

this text, preserved only in Chinese, we have the first systematical treatise on logic which has come down to us from Buddhist schools. It is in fact evident that the various logical topics have been here arranged in a more satisfactory way than in the *Yogacaryābhūmiśāstra* or in its cognate works. This text has been completely translated by me into Sanscrit, so that it is now accessible to scholars who cannot read Chinese. It will not be out of place to give here a notice of the most important features of this book. It has for a long time been a matter of discussion whether the *trairūpya* theory is to be ascribed to Diññāga or not. It is in fact known that the *pakṣadharmaṭā sapakṣasattva* and the *vipakṣasattva* is to be found also in *Praśastapāda*. So that scholars were of two different opinions. Some held that the *trairūpya* theory was an innovation introduced by Diññāga ; others were inclined to think that *Praśastapāda* was responsible for it. The question admitted of doubt because we knew practically nothing about Buddhist logic before Diññāga. But the *nyāya* treatise, about which we are now speaking and which, if not the *Vādavidhi* itself, reproduces theories that are almost the same as those of the *Vādavidhi*, in all points where a comparison of the two texts is possible, solves the question. Of course the priority of *Praśastapāda* seems to be impossible even for other reasons ; first of all, because there is a complete sentence

of the Nyāyamukha to be found also in the Pramāṇasamuccaya which is literally quoted by Praśastapāda. But the Chinese translation of the Nyāya-treatise, which may be still called, though quite hypothetically, a Tarkaśāstra points out unmistakeably the existence of the *trairūpya* theory before Diṅnāga and shows that, even before this great master, logical doctrines were largely and systematically discussed in the Buddhist schools as is proved by the fragments and treatises lost in their Sanscrit original but translated into Chinese or alluded to in Chinese sources and even in the commentary by Diṅnāga himself upon the Pramāṇasamuccaya. Now in this book the *trairūpya* theory is clearly expounded. In the second chapter dealing with the *jātis* there is a long discussion about the *sādharmya-* and *vaidharmya-jāti*. The method of our book is this : first it gives the definition of the *jātis* which is almost the same as that to be found in the Nyāyasūtras and then the example is explained. The author formulates a syllogism such as the following “ sound is non-eternal, because a product, etc.” Then the *prativādin* is introduced who tries to refute the validity of the given syllogism by a *jāti*. The *vādin* in reply shows that the arguments adduced by the opponent are not valid, because illogical. In the example already given the opponent is supposed to reply that the syllogism is not valid, because if the analogy with a pot, etc., is sufficient to prove the non-eternity

of sound, then, its homogeneity with ether, etc., will also prove that sound is eternal; and there is such a similarity between ether and sound. Both in fact are equally devoid of a tangible form, that is to say they are *amūrtā*. Now the reply of the author of the so-called *Tarkaśāstra* is that such a refutation is not valid, but it is a mere *jāti*. In fact the reason given by the opponent is inconclusive inasmuch as it does not indicate any absolute and fixed relation of the reason itself with the attribute to be proved. It has no *vyāpti* and therefore the argument is vitiated by the logical mistake called *anaikāntika*. But the *Tarkaśāstra* adds also that the *sādhana*, as expounded in the book, is faultless, because the *hetu* of it is possessed of three characteristics, that is it expresses the *pakṣadharmatā*, viz., the condition of being the subject of the proposition, the *sapakṣasattva*, that is the fact that the attribute to be proved is certainly present in all positive instances and the *vipakṣavyāvṛtti*, that is that it is absolutely absent in all negative instances. The statement contained in this fragment is also alluded to in other portions of the same text and it is of a very high importance because it shows in clear terms that the *trairūpya* theory was known before *Diṅnāga*. But it is also to be noted that there was some slight difference between *Diṅnāga* and his predecessors as regards the exact meaning and import of the three terms. In fact it must be

remembered that the Chinese translation uses as regards the third aspect of the reason a character which corresponds to "exclusion" that is Sanscrit *vyāvṛtti*. This definition was not accepted by Diññāga, who criticised it in the *Nyāyamukha* and substituted for it the rule *vipakṣāsattva*, which after him was generally accepted by all logicians.

We find many other interesting features in this fragment provisionally called by us *Tarkaśāstra*. It still maintains the five-fold syllogism which, if we are to follow the Chinese tradition, was reduced by Vasubandhu to three members only and it follows the same terminology as the *Nyāya-sūtras*. It seems to know the theory of the *pakṣa* as the formulation of a thesis quite independent of the five-fold *sādhana* intended to prove it, because in the *chala*-chapter we find mention of four of the five *pakṣābhāsas* known to Diññāga, that is, it refers to : the *svavacanaviruddha*, contradicted by the very terms in which the sentence is formulated, *pratyakṣaviruddha* or contradicted by direct experience, *anumānaviruddha* or contradicted by inference, *lokaviruddha* or contradicted by common belief (called in other sources *pratīti-viruddha*). No mention is to be found of the fifth *pakṣābhāsa* enumerated by Diññāga, I mean the *āgama-viruddha*, contradicted on the authority of the holy texts. But since this section is not exactly concerned with the *pakṣa* theory it would be far-fetched to conclude from the silence in this special

connection that the *Tarkaśāstra* ignored the fifth *pakṣābhāṣa*.

Another point that distinguishes the *Tarkaśāstra* from the *Nyāyasūtras* is the theory of logical errors. It is in fact known that according to the *Nyāyasūtras* these logical mistakes are five in number—*savyabhicāra*, *viruddha*, *prakaranya-sama*, *sādhyasama*, *kālātīta*.

Now we have already seen that Asaṅga enumerated three *hetvābhāṣas* only instead of five, and he seems to consider them as varieties of the contradictory one. Our book in the same way enumerates three *hetvābhāṣas* which are the same as those attributed by Diṅnāga to Vādavidhi and which were also accepted, though defined in a different way, by Diṅnāga himself. They are the *asiddha*, the *anaikāntika* and the *viruddha*. But it is worthy of notice that some of the examples here given agree with those of Praśastapāda. In fact the example of the *asiddha* is: “a horse is coming, because we see the horns.” This case is considered as an *asiddha* by the Vaiśeṣikasūtras, but as *viruddha* by Praśastapāda. Example of the *anaikāntika* is: “the cow is coming, because we see the horns.” This very example is given by the Vaiśeṣikasūtras as *anaikāntika*, but by Praśastapāda as *sandigdha*. These are the principal points in which our text does not agree with the logical scheme of the *Nyāyasūtras*, but so far as other classifications are

concerned the two texts follow as a rule the same plan. This fact has its weight because it shows that in spite of the peculiarities of each text as regards purely epistemological or dogmatical points, a general agreement as to the catalogues of *vivāda* is to be found in our sources, because it is impossible to carry on a discussion on any subject, if the speakers do not agree as to the fundamental rules to be followed in a controversy as regards the meaning, extent and import of those points which mark a definite inferiority of one of the disputants. That is why all the various catalogues of *vivāda*-rules belonging to the same epoch are on the whole pretty similar. The four *siddhāntas*, though their name and definition is not given in our fragment, are alluded to. Moreover the catalogue of the *Nigrahasthānas* is exactly the same as that of the *Nyāyasūtras*. A general agreement is to be found also in the other section which has so much bearing upon the general development of a *vāda*, I mean the *jāti* or fallacious refutation. The *jātis*, as is known, do not seem to have had among the Buddhists the same importance and the same fortune which they enjoyed in orthodox *nyāya*. The Buddhists with *Dīnnāga* and *Dharmakīrti* elaborated a very minute and complex theory of the logical foundation of inference. The syllogism rested upon the general laws of our judgment and it had no longer that apodictic value which it possessed at the beginning

of nyāya speculation. So formal logic depends in fact upon some fixed and simple laws which eliminate the casuistry of previous heuristic. That is why Diññāga in his *Nyāyamukha* and *Pramāṇasamuccaya* reduced the number of *jātis*, showing that they are nothing else but varieties of the logical *hetvābhāsas* which he had determined. And after him Śaṅkarasvāmin does not take the *jātis* any longer into consideration. These are for him as well as for Dharmakīrti nothing else but *dūṣaṇābhāsas*, wrong refutation, and the fallacies rest upon the fact that the counter-argument used by the adversary is inficiated by a wrong reason. In our *Tarkaśāstra* we also already find the tendency to reduce the *jātis* to mere logical errors. They are no longer twenty-four as in the *Nyāyasūtras*, but only sixteen. And at the same time a classification is given of them which is to be found also in the *Vāda-vidhi*, as we can deduce from the reference to this text that we read in the last chapter of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* concerned with the *jātis*. They are in fact divided into three classes : *viparīta* with ten items, *asat* or *abhūta* with three items, and *viruddha* with three items. All the varieties of *jātis* given in this catalogue can be found in the *Nyāyasūtras* with the exception of the *svārthaviruddha* and the *anuktisama*. The list will be reduced to fourteen items by Diññāga. As regards the *nigrahasthānas* there is, as I said, complete agreement between our text and the *Nyāyasūtras*. The

examples also given to illustrate the various *nigrahas* are generally similar to those of *Nyāyasūtras* which implies once more that we are confronted with stereotyped formulas, as current in the *vāda*-manuals of the time. Owing to the mutilated condition of the text we cannot state to what school it did belong. Of course all along the book the theses maintained are : non-eternity of sound, non-existence of *ātman*, the impossibility of admitting of any existence whatever. But it is impossible to deduce any conclusion from these expressions because they belong to the common stock of Buddhist dogmatics. The only thing which must be noted here is that the first chapter containing examples and refutation of the *chala* seems to refute the *prasaṅga*-method of the *mādhyamikas* while the reference to the *tathatā* in the same section points perhaps at a *yogācāra* origin. It is impossible to state anything more precise. But whatever the case might have been, there is no doubt that this text is the most important *nyāya*-treatise anterior to *Diṅnāga*. It shows that logic was already systematised among Buddhist schools in manuals which may quite well be considered as the counterpart of the Brahminical *Nyāyasūtras* with their *bhāṣya*. The great interest of the discussions therein contained, the doctrines alluded to in it, the reference to contemporary sects, the tradition preserved in Chinese sources of the great authority that the book enjoyed in Central Asia

and even in China, where it was the recognised text-book of nyāya in the monasteries, make us complain that we have now a mere fragment of it. Whether the work is the Vādavidhi or a different one, there is no doubt that it contains ideas and doctrines which Diññāga found before him and which in many places he refuted, in his treatises, and in other places followed. It is still a *vivāda*-text, but it shows an enormous progress upon the first attempts and mere catalogues of the older treatises, as we can see quite well when we compare it with the *vāda*-sections contained in Maitreyanātha and in Asaṅga. It embodies also criticism of theories that were accepted by the orthodox Naiyāyikas. Such is for instance a very important passage in which the validity of *arthāpatti* as a separate *pramāṇa* is attacked by our text. Now in Vātsyāyana's Nyāyabhāṣya we find this very criticism cited and again refuted. There is no doubt, as we can judge from the exact correspondence between the text as it is in Chinese and the quotation by Vātsyāyana that the Bhāsyakāra was referring to our treatise. It is evident that the studies of Indian logic can be largely benefited by the investigation of this text. So once more we must be grateful to the Chinese, who along with the Tibetans, have preserved many important documents of Indian speculation, which would otherwise have been completely lost to us.

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